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COMMENT
INTEREST-FREE LOANS AND THE TAX
COURT: A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD
PROBLEM
For purposes of the federal income tax, the definition of gross income is
quite broad in scope.' Recognizing that breadth, the courts have long held
that gross income includes not only tangible income, that received in the
form of cash or property, but also intangible income, benefits received in a
form other than cash or property.2 Therefore, it was surprising when the
United States Tax Court, in Dean v. Commissioner,3 established a rule al-
lowing taxpayers to escape reporting as income the economic benefits de-
rived from an interest-free loan. It is equally surprising that in a series of
recent cases the Tax Court has steadfastly refused to reconsider its posi-
tion, calling instead upon Congress to resolve the problem.4
While there are no statistics available to show the frequency with which
interest-free loans are granted, tax practitioners now often recommend
1. I.R.C. § 61(a) provides that "gross income means all income from whatever source
derived." See Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956) ("[I1n defining 'gross in-
come' . . . Congress intended to 'tax all gains except those specifically exempted.' ") (citing
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1955)).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931) (repurchase of
bonds at a discount); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (payment
of employee's income taxes by employer); Silverman v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1061 (1957),
aff'd, 253 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1958) (wife's travel expenses paid by husband's employer);
Chandler v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 165, 171, 173 (1940), ag'd, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941)
(rent-free use of corporation's lodge). See generally 2 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 11.02 (rev. ed. 1974); J. CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 13 (2d ed. 1973).
3. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
4. Baker v. Commissioner, [1980 Transfer Binder] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (75 T.C.) Dec.
37,354 (Oct. 22, 1980); Beaton v. Commissioner, TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) (40 T.C.M.)
Dec. 37,275(M) (Sept. 22, 1980); Parks v. Commissioner, TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) (40
T.C.M.) Dec. 37,238(M) (Sept. 15, 1980); Estate of Liechtung v. Commissioner, TAX CT.
MEM. DEC. (CCH) (40 T.C.M.) Dec. 37,198(M) (Sept. 2, 1980); Marsh v. Commissioner, 73
T.C. 317 (1979); Martin v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 531 (1979), appeal docketed,
No. 80-1200 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 1980); Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979), appeal
docketed, No. 80-3135 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 1980); Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979),
appeal docketed, No. 80-5084 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 1980); Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
931 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7624 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 1979). For a discussion of the
most significant of these cases, see notes 31-82 and accompanying text infra.
Catholic University Law Review
their use and suggest that their use is growing.5 Professional athletes, for
example, are demanding interest-free loans as part of their compensation
packages, and employers have begun providing interest-free loans to their
employees for home mortgages and for other private purposes.6 The pres-
ent rate of inflation, pushing even modest income up into higher and
higher tax brackets, could make interest-free loans attractive as a means to
combat ever-increasing tax liabilities.
In the past two years, the Tax Court has decided nine cases dealing with
the proper income tax treatment of interest-free loans.7 The court has ad-
vanced the position that an interest-free loan is economically equivalent to
an interest-bearing loan accompanied by an increase in income to cover
the interest charged and that, because of the availability of an offsetting
interest deduction, the economic benefit derived from an interest-free (or
low-interest) loan should be excluded from a taxpayer's gross income in
order to produce equal tax treatment between taxpayers having either type
of loan.8
This Comment examines the Tax Court's exclusion approach and con-
cludes that whether an offsetting deduction is available or not, the exclu-
sion approach not only yields disparate tax results for similarly situated
5. Callahan, How to Use Interest-Free Loans in Business Tax Planning, 11 PRAc. Ac-
COUNTANT 28 (1978); Herskovitz, Techniques Available to Shield the High Income of the
"Superstar", 34 J. TAX. 270, 273 (1971). The Wall Street Journal recently reported that
during 1980 Mobil Corporation gave Montgomery Ward & Co. $300,000,000 in interest-free
loans and further agreed to advance additional funds in 1981 if necessary. See Weiner,
Montgomery Ward is Given $100 Million ofAdditional Funding by Mobil Corp., Wall St. J.,
Jan. 26, 1981, at 2, col. 2.
6. Duhl & Fine, New Case Allowing Interest Deduction Callsfor Reappraisal of No-
Interest Loans, 44 J. TAx. 34 (1976).
7. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
8. See Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 947-48. While this Comment focuses
on the income tax consequences to the borrower of an interest-free loan, there are other tax
issues involved. One such issue is whether the economic benefit derived from an interest-
free loan is subject to the federal gift tax. See Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73
(N.D. Tex. 1966); Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), aft'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.
1978); Frazier, Interest-Free Loans between Family Members. What Practitioners Can Expect
after Crown, 48 J. TAX. 28 (1978); O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAND. L.
REV. 1085, 1086-94 (1974); Taicher, How to Use Interest-Free Loans in Family Tax Planning,
11 PRAC. ACCOUNTANT 24 (1978); Comment, Tax Consequences of an Interest Free Loan, 24
Loy. L. REV. 33, 37-44 (1978). Another issue relating to the income tax consequences of an
interest-free loan is whether the lender of such a loan can be charged with imputed interest
income. See Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 957-58 (Nims, J., dissenting); Keller,
The Tax Consequences of Interest-Free Loans from Corporations to Shareholders and from
Employers to Employees, 19 B.C.L. Rev. 231, 244-50, 251-52 (1978); Roth, Can Lender be
Charged with Receiving Taxable Income as a Result ofan Interest-Free Loan?, 52 J. TAX. 136
(1980); Comment, supra, at 48-50. But see Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090
(1961). See also note 52 infra.
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taxpayers but also opens the door to potential abuse. To alleviate such
problems, this Comment recommends including the interest-free loan ben-
efit in a taxpayer's gross income and allowing an imputed interest deduc-
tion where it is otherwise justifiable.
I. DEAN V COMMISSIONER: THE COURT'S INITIAL ERROR
A. How It Al Happened
The Tax Court first considered whether a borrower might realize income
from an interest-free loan in Dean v. Commissioner.9 In that case, the tax-
payers had received more than $2,500,000 in interest-free loans from their
wholly-owned corporation.' The Commissioner asserted a deficiency, ar-
guing that the taxpayers should have reported as income the economic
benefit derived from their interest-free use of the corporation's funds.'" In
support of his argument, the Commissioner cited several cases holding that
rent-free use of corporate property constitutes gross income.' 2 There is no
difference, the Commissioner argued, between a shareholder's use of cor-
porate property for less-than-adequate consideration and a shareholder's
use of corporate money for less-than-adequate consideration.
Recognizing that "the question may not be completely free from doubt,"
the Tax Court disagreed.13 The court distinguished the facts in Dean from
those in the cases cited by the Commissioner on the ground that an actual
expenditure by the taxpayers in the Commissioner's cases to procure the
benefit derived would not have been deductible; whereas, had the taxpay-
9. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961). The court held, on an unrelated issue, that the taxpayers were
not entitled to a deduction for interest paid on certain insurance loans after the date on
which they had assigned the beneficial ownership of the insurance policies to their children.
Id. at 1085.
10. Id at 1088.
11. Id at 1087.
12. Id at 1089-90. See Rodgers Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 66 (1950) (rent-
free use of corporation's automobile); Dean v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 256 (1947), aff'd, 187
F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 195 1) (rent-free use of corporation's house); Chandler v. Commissioner,
41 B.T.A. 165 (1940), affid, 119 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1941) (rent-free use of corporation's apart-
ment and lodge); Reynard Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934) (rent-free use of
corporation's house). Cf Silverman v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1061 (1957), aff'd 253 F.2d
849 (8th Cir. 1958) (wife's travel expenses paid by husband's employer); Greenspun v. Com-
missioner, 23 T.C. 138 (1954), rey'd on other grounds, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956) (farm
expenses paid by corporation).
13. 35 T.C. at 1089. Dean was a case of first impression for the court, but the Commis-
sioner had previously expressed the opinion that an interest-free advance of funds by an
employer in connection with a split-dollar life insurance plan did not constitute realized
income to the employee. See Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 C.B. 23, revoked, Rev. Rul. 64-328,
1964-2 C.B. 11.
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ers in Dean actually paid interest, it would have been deductible. 14 With
no other stated reasoning, the court held that "an interest-free loan results
in no taxable gain to the borrower."
15
In a concurring opinion joined by three other judges, Judge Opper
urged caution. He read the majority opinion as holding that the taxpayers
had realized no gross income, and he argued that the majority's statement
of "no taxable gain" from an interest-free loan was much too broad.16 He
also saw the exclusion of gross income based on the availability of a de-
duction as being contrary to the holdings in the cases advanced by the
Commissioner. 7 He further noted that a deduction for interest might be
barred by statute, implying that the availability of an interest deduction
was not quite as automatic as the majority appeared to have assumed.
18
Judge Bruce, dissenting, considered the Commissioner's analogy of an
interest-free loan to the rent-free use of property to be appropriate.' 9
Agreeing with Judge Opper that the majority had excluded the economic
benefit from the taxpayer's gross income and that the majority's "no taxa-
ble gain" statement was too broad, Judge Bruce further argued that the
taxpayers should have been required to plead and prove the availability of
a deduction."
14. 35 T.C. at 1090. Some commentators have questioned the Dean court's logic in
creating an exemption from gross income based on the availability of a deduction. See J.
CHOMMIE, supra note 2, § 29, at 60; Schlifke, Taxing as Income the Recept of Interest-Free
Loans, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 346, 349 (1966).
15. The court's language was:
We have heretofore given full force to interest-free loans for tax purposes, hold-
ing that they result in no interest deduction for the borrower, . . . nor interest
income to the lender. . . .We think it to be equally true that an interest-free loan
results in no taxable gain to the borrower, and we hold that the Commissioner is
not entitled to any increased deficiency based upon this issue.
35 T.C. at 1090 (citations omitted). In contrast to the Dean court's dictum, the Tax Court
has stated in recent cases that a deduction is allowable to the borrower of an interest-free
loan for imputed interest. See, e.g., Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317, 328 (1979); Creel
v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 1180; Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 951. See also
note 45 infra. For a discussion of the Dean court's statement that an interest-free loan re-
sults in no interest income to the lender, see note 52 infra.
16. 35 T.C. at 1090-91 (Opper, J., concurring).
17. Id at 1091.
18. Id In large part, it may be a concern over the availability of an interest deduction
that has caused the courts and commentators to overlook the problems that exist in the
exclusion approach even where an offsetting interest deduction is available. For a discussion
of some of those problems, see notes 83-96 and accompanying text infra.
19. 35 T.C. at 1091-92 (Bruce, J., dissenting).
20. Id at 1092. Judge Bruce agreed with Judge Opper that a deduction might be barred
by statute. Id
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B. The Analytical Deficiencies
There were two basic deficiencies in the Tax Court's decision in Dean:
the holding was not at all clear and there was little analysis to support it.
The court in Dean stated that "no taxable income is realized [from an
interest-free loan]"'" and that "an interest-free loan results in no taxable
gain to the borrower.'"22 While the court's language appears to be clear, it
is subject to at least two interpretations: (1) that because of the availability
of an offsetting interest deduction the taxpayer may exclude from gross
income the economic benefit derived from an interest-free loan, 3 or (2)
that the taxpayer must include the benefit in gross income but is entitled to
an imputed deduction for the interest that would have been paid.2 4 Be-
cause Dean was a case of first impression, the court should have used a
traditional approach to determination of taxable income. Determination
of taxable income traditionally requires two inquiries:25 first, whether the
taxpayer has realized gross income and second, whether the taxpayer is
entitled to any deductions. The Dean court, however, never examined the
issue of gross income and merely assumed the availability of a deduc-
tion.2 6 Thus, neither the holding nor the analysis of Dean gave taxpayers
21. Id at 1089. The court's use of the phrase "no taxable income is realized" was ob-
scure. "Realization" is a term of art for purposes of the federal income tax referring to
whether and when an item must be included in a taxpayer's gross income. See Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). See generall, I J. MERTENS, supra note 2, § 5.04. Thus a
taxpayer realizes gross income and not taxable income. Taxable income is the amount re-
suiting when available deductions are subtracted from gross income. See J. CHOMMIE,
supra note 2, § 44. The Dean court's use of ambiguous language is one of the reasons that its
holding is unclear. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text infra.
In two of its more recent cases, the Tax Court appears to have blurred the question of
when, if ever, the economic benefit derived from an interest-free loan is realized for pur-
poses of the federal income tax. Compare Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 951, with
Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. at 328. For a discussion of this apparent dichotomy, see
notes 33 & 73-77 and accompanying text infra.
22. 35 T.C. at 1090.
23. The concurring and dissenting judges in Dean interpreted the majority as holding
that because of the availability of an offsetting deduction, the taxpayers had realized no
gross income from their interest-free loans. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra.
Dean has been cited for the proposition that economic benefit derived from an interest-free
loan is excludable from gross income. See, e.g., United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118, 120
(5th Cir. 1968); 1 J. MERTENS, supra note 2, § 6A.01, at 11; J. CHOMMIE, supra note 2, § 29,
at 60.
24. For a discussion of the effect of using an approach of including in gross income the
economic benefit derived from an interest-free loan, see notes 97-101 and accompanying text
infra.
25. See J. CHOMMIE, supra note 2, § 44.
26. In a later case the Tax Court seemed to imply that the Commissioner had stipulated
in Dean that an interest deduction would have been available. See Creel v. Commissioner,
72 T.C. at 1179 ("as the parties [in Dean] had, in effect, stipulated that had petitioner paid a
19811
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and future courts much guidance.27
II. CURRENT CASES-THE COURT APPLIES THE RULE IN DEAN
'Twelve years passed before the Commissioner acted on the Dean case
by announcing his nonacquiescence in 1973.28 The Tax Court acted even
more slowly, waiting until 1979 to reexamine Dean in Greenspun v. Com-
missioner.29 Courts addressing the issue after Greenspun have added little
regular rate on this loan, the full amount of interest would have been deductible"). Presum-
ably, if the Commissioner had agreed to such a stipulation, the Dean court could have docu-
mented it. What the Creel court meant by "in effect, had stipulated" is unclear.
27. Most commentators have been critical of the Dean result. See generally Keller,
supra note 8; O'Hare, supra note 8; Schlifke, supra note 14; Comment, supra note 8. One
commentator, however, has offered a policy rationale for the Dean decision. In an article
published in 1965, four years after Dean, Professor Joseph Sneed suggested that a theory of
economic equivalence would support the Dean result. Professor Sneed proposed that an
interest-free loan is economically equivalent to an interest-bearing loan accompanied by an
increase in compensation or dividends to cover the interest charged. Sneed, Unlabeled In-
come and Section 483, CAL. TAX INST. 643 (1965). This economic equivalence led Professor
Sneed to assume that, in cases where the interest would otherwise be deductible, the tax
results should likewise be equal. Id at 652-53.
Professor Sneed suggested two ways in which such equal tax treatment could be afforded:
(1) exclude from the borrower's gross income the value of the interest expense that was
avoided (an exclusion approach), or (2) include the benefit in the borrower's gross income
and allow an imputed deduction for the interest that would have been paid (an inclusion
approach). Id at 652. Anticipating the difficulties in obtaining a deduction for interest that
was neither paid nor owed, Professor Sneed reasoned that the exclusion approach was pref-
erable. Id at 653.
Fourteen years after the Sneed article was published, the Tax Court adopted an exclusion
approach as its explanation of the Dean result. See Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at
947-48. See also notes 41-42 and accompanying text infra. Problems created by the Tax
Court's exclusion approach can be avoided by an inclusion approach. See notes 97-101 and
accompanying text infra.
28. 1973-2 C.B. 4. The Commissioner's 12-year delay in announcing his nonacquies-
cence to Dean has been a recurring source of concern to the Tax Court. In Greenspun v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 952-53 n.22, the court first mentioned the Commissioner's delay,
stating that
[a]lthough we can certainly appreciate [the Commissioner's] arguments to the effect
that the [Dean] decision . . . is laden with some potential for abuse, we think it
important to point out that [the Commissioner] has not aided his position by wait-
ing approximately 13 years to publicly announce his disagreement with the deci-
sion.
Later, in Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 1013, the court construed the Commissioner's
delay as an acceptance of the Dean result. Most recently, in Baker v. Commissioner, [1980
Transfer Binder] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (75 T.C.) Dec. 37,354, at 4351 (Oct. 22, 1980), the
court appeared to offer the delay as a reason for not overruling Dean.
29. 72 T.C. 931 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7624 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 1979). Before
Greenspun, the Tax Court had mentioned Dean in several cases but in none of them was its
rationale analyzed. See Suttle v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1638 (1978), a 'd, 625
F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980) (Dean followed by the Tax Court and the court of appeals without
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to the Greenspun court's explanation of Dean-some have even served to
obfuscate the Tax Court's exclusion approach. For the most part, the more
recent cases have merely established the Tax Court's refusal to reconsider
its position.3"
A. Greenspun v. Commissioner. An Ill-Fated ,4ttempt to Explain
In Greenspun, the Tax Court held that the economic benefit derived
from a low-interest loan did not constitute gross income even though the
preferential rate had been granted as compensation for services rendered.
Herman Greenspun had received a $4,000,000, low-interest loan from bil-
lionaire Howard Hughes3 in exchange for favorable press coverage by the
Las Vegas television station and newspaper that Greenspun owned.32 The
Commissioner argued that Greenspun had been granted the favorable in-
terest rate as compensation for services and that, therefore, the present
value of the economic benefit should have been included in the taxpayer's
gross income.33 The court agreed with the Commissioner's first proposi-
tion, and held that Greenspun had been granted the loan and its favorable
terms both as compensation for services actually rendered and as induce-
ment to enter into certain property transactions.34
Turning to the issue of gross income, the court discussed its holding in
Dean, noting that in Dean it had distinguished between interest-free loans
a discussion of its rationale.); Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), afJ'd, 585 F.2d
234 (7th Cir. 1978) (Dean cited with approval but not discussed); Lisle v. Commissioner, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) 627 (1976) (Dean distinguished on its facts); Genshaft v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 282 (1975) (Dean distinguished on its facts); Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1169 (1972), aft'd, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974) (Dean cited with
approval but not discussed). In Saunders v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Hawaii
1968), rey'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971), the district court held that the
taxpayer realized no income from interest-free notes used to finance his share of real estate
investment. The Saunders court neither set out an analytical approach nor cited Dean.
30. See note 53 infra.
31. 72 T.C. at 936. Hughes had not wanted to charge any interest, but because his
attorney feared that the Internal Revenue Service might question an interest-free loan, the
parties agreed on an interest rate of 3%. Id at 934.
32. Id. at 943. There was evidence that the low-interest loan was intended to induce
Greenspun to sell his television station. Id at 943-44.
33. Id at 941, 950. The court, in dictum, rejected the Commissioner's present value
approach, stating that "[tihe economic benefit which [the Commissioner] seeks to tax is the
use of the funds in question at a preferential rate of interest. By its very nature, realization
of this economic benefit occurs only during each taxable period in which the funds are actu-
ally used or available for use." Id at 951 (emphasis in original). Recently, the court seems
to have retreated from this position. See Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. at 328. See also
note 77 and accompanying text infra.
34. 72 T.C. at 945.
19811
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and rent-free use of corporate property.3- Apparently attempting to clarify
its holding in Dean, the Greenspun court stated: "In so distinguishing the
cases involving rent-free use of corporate property . . . ourfinding of no
taxable income to the taxpayers was not grounded on the imputed interest
deduction, but rather was based on the conclusion that 'an interest-free
loan results in no taxable gain to the borrower.'"36 The court then held
that, under the rule in Dean, Greenspun's compensation was not subject to
income tax.37
In response to the Commissioner's argument that Dean was incorrectly
decided and should be overruled, the court engaged in a detailed analysis
of the question whether the economic benefit derived from the low-interest
(or interest-free) use of funds should be included in a taxpayer's gross in-
come. The court began its analysis by noting that the broad interpretation
traditionally given to section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code has repeat-
edly formed the basis for concluding that the use of corporate assets by a
shareholder or employee for less-than-adequate payment results in an eco-
nomic benefit that is taxable as income.38 Further, the court stated that the
35. Id. at 945-46 (quoting Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961)).
36. 72 T.C. at 946 (emphasis added). The court's statement was perhaps even less clear
than its holding in Dean. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the distinction between a
court's finding and its conclusion is more than semantic, the court's statement nonetheless
begs the question. Given that the court's finding was based on its conclusion, one is still left
to speculate about the basis for its conclusion.
37. Id at 946. As had been the case in Dean, the holding in Greenspun is subject to two
interpretations: (1) that Greenspun's compensation was excludable from gross income or, (2)
that Greenspun's compensation was includable in gross income but, because of the availa-
bility of an offsetting deduction, it resulted in no increase in taxable income. The Greenspun
court's discussion of Dean, see notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra, and its failure to
examine the availability of the interest deduction point to the first interpretation. However,
none of the courts following Greenspun have explicitly stated that the economic benefit de-
rived from an interest-free loan is excludable from gross income. When subsequent courts
have clearly stated a holding, it has been that taxpayers receive no taxable income from
interest-free loans. See Baker v. Commissioner, [1980 Transfer Binder] TAX CT. REP.
(CCH) (75 T.C.) Dec. 37,354 (Oct. 22, 1980) (no clear statement of the holding); Beaton v.
Commissioner, TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) (40 T.C.M.) Dec. 37,275(M) (Sept. 22, 1980) (no
additional taxable income); Parks v. Commissioner, TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) (40
T.C.M.) Dec. 37,238(M) (Sept. 15, 1980) (no clear statement of the holding); Estate of Liech-
tung v. Commissioner, TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) (40 T.C.M.) Dec. 37,198(M) (Sept. 2,
1980) (no clear statement of the holding); Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. at 326 (no taxa-
ble income); Martin v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 535 (no taxable income); Creel v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 1180 (no direct tax effect); Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009
(1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-5084 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 1980) (no clear statement of the hold-
ing). In each case, however, the court has refused to overrule Dean.
38. 72 T.C. at 946-47. Many of the cases upon which the Greenspun court relied upon
for its conclusion were the very ones rejected by the court in Dean as having only a "superfi-
cial resemblance" to an interest-free loan case. See Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083,
1090 (1961).
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use of funds, absent a corresponding obligation to pay interest (or accom-
panied by an obligation to pay interest at a favorable rate), "[u]ndeniably
. . . constitutes as valuable an economic benefit as would any rent-free use
of a residence, automobile, or boat,"39 and concluded that "where, as here,
a loan at a favorable rate is granted in exchange for services, the borrower
has realized a clear economic benefit taxable as income."'  The court sug-
gested that its holding in Dean had been based on the proposition that an
interest-free loan to a shareholder or employee is economically indistin-
guishable from an interest-bearing loan accompanied by an increase in
dividends or compensation to cover the interest charged.4 The court then
39. 72 T.C. at 947. In stating that the interest-free use of funds constitutes a valuable
economic benefit, the court cited with approval Mason v. United States, 513 F.2d 25 (7th
Cir. 1975). In Mason, a taxpayer made a sale to a charity taking as partial payment a note
that bore a lower-than-market interest rate. The court of appeals held that the taxpayer was
entitled to a charitable contribution deduction to the extent that the value of the property
transferred exceeded the value of the note. At least one commentator has argued that the
allowance of a deduction in Mason indicates that a loan at a preferential rate (and thus, one
would presume, an interest-free loan) constitutes an economic benefit. See Duhl & Fine,
Interest-Free Loans and the Tax Court Is Dean Weakening Under IRS Attacks?, 51 J. TAX.
322, 322 (1979).
40. 72 T.C. at 947.
41. Id at 947-48. The court illustrated its assumption of economic equivalence with an
example:
[A]ssume that A, an employee of X Co., received as his only form of compensa-
tion an interest-free loan from X Co. in the amount of $20,000 for a period of I
year. Further assume the prevailing interest rate at the time was 5 percent or
$1,000 a year. The economic effect of this transaction is the same as if X Co. had
charged A interest at 5 percent on the $20,000 loan, and, at the same time, paid him
a salary of $1,000 which A in turn used to pay the interest. Assuming no other
facts, in the second hypothetical, A would have gross income from his salary of
$1,000 and an interest deduction of $1,000 or taxable income of $0. Consistent
with this result, in the first hypothetical involving the interest-free loan, A's taxable
income under our holding in Dean would be $0.
Id. at 948. Some commentators disagree with the court's broad assumption of economic
equivalence. One commentator has pointed out that the employee who receives an interest-
bearing loan and an increase in compensation to cover the interest charged might not use the
additional salary to pay interest, thus precluding the Greenspun court's economic equiva-
lence. See Schlifke, supra note 14, at 353-54 n.32.
Another commentator has pointed out that the existing tax laws might preclude economic
equivalence between shareholders who borrow from their corporations, depending on
whether the loans are interest-bearing or interest-free. See Keller, supra note 8, at 236 &
n.30. The following example, based on an example in Professor Keller's article, illustrates
the problem. Assume that 4 and B are shareholders of X Corp. and that X Corp. makes a
one-year loan of $100,000 to each shareholder. Assume further that 4's loan is interest-free
and that B's loan bears interest at the rate of 20%. Lastly, assume that X Corp. distributes
$20,000 to B to cover the interest charged and that X Corp. has neither current nor accumu-
lated earnings and profits. Applying the Tax Court's exclusion approach, A would have
neither income nor deduction from the transaction. B, however, would derive an interest
deduction of $20,000 but no dividend income. That is because I.R.C. § 316(a) provides that
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explained that its holding in Dean had been intended to produce equal tax
treatment between taxpayers having either type of loan. 2
The court admitted, however, that its exclusion approach would not al-
ways produce equal tax results between taxpayers with interest-free loans
and those with interest-bearing loans accompanied by an increase in in-
come.43 It then stated that, should it be presented with a case in which the
two loan transactions are shown to result in different tax treatments, it
would then decide whether Dean applies and, if so, whether Dean should
be followed.' In response to the Commissioner's argument that section
163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code would not allow a deduction for in-
terest that is neither paid nor owed, the court stated that an exception to
that rule was necessary in the case of an interest-free loan in order to give
recognition to the economic realities of the transaction. 5
a corporate distribution constitutes a dividend only to the extent of current or accumulated
earnings and profits. See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 7.01 (4th ed. 1979).
42. 72 T.C. at 948.
43. Id. As an example of the possibility of disparate tax results, the court noted that its
exclusion approach might alter the allowance of deductions that are affected by the amount
of a taxpayer's income. Id at 949-50. For a discussion of such disparate tax results, see
notes 83-91 and accompanying text infra.
44. 72 T.C. at 950. The Commissioner apparently has chosen to show disparate tax
results by raising the availability of an interest deduction as an issue. See, e.g., Baker v.
Commissioner, [1980 Transfer Binder] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (75 T.C.) Dec. 37,354, at 4352
(Oct. 22, 1980); Estate of Liechtung v. Commissioner, TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) (40
T.C.M.) Dec. 37,198(M), at 1118 (Sept. 2, 1980); Martin v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 535 n.8; Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 1179. Several commentators have pointed out
that the exclusion approach fails when an offsetting deduction for interest is barred by stat-
ute. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 8, at 236-37; O'Hare, supra note 8, at 1095; Schlifke, supra
note 14, at 349-50; Sneed, supra note 27, at 654. Disparate tax treatment can result, however,
even when a deduction for interest is available. See notes 83-91 and accompanying text
infra.
45. 72 T.C. at 951. I.R.C. § 163(a) allows a deduction for "all interest paid or accrued
within the taxable year on indebtedness." The Greenspun court recognized the general rule
that a cash basis taxpayer, such as Greenspun, may not deduct interest unless it has actually
been paid pursuant to a legal obligation. 72 T.C. at 951 (citing Christensen v. Commis-
sioner, 40 T.C. 563, 577-78 (1963); D. Loveman & Son Export Corp. v. Commissioner, 34
T.C. 776, 805-06 (1960), aft'd, 296 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 860 (1962);
Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 364 (1946), rev'don other grounds, 162 F.2d
316 (5th Cir. 1947)). It distinguished the cited cases, however, because none of them had
"dealt with the precise question of whether a taxpayer who must report as income the eco-
nomic benefit associated with a low or no-interest loan is entitled to claim an offsetting
interest deduction." 72 T.C. at 951 (emphasis added). The court did not state whether its
distinction would apply in cases, such as Greenspun, where the taxpayer does not have to
report income.
The Greenspun court's finding that the economic benefit derived from an interest-free loan
is includable in gross income, see note 40 and accompanying text supra, coupled with its
statement that it would allow an imputed interest deduction to reflect economic reality re-
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The failure of the Greenspun majority to clarify Dean can be illustrated
by comparing the concurring opinions. Judge Dawson, in a concurrence
joined by four other judges, "agreed" with the majority that Greenspun
had realized gross income from the low-interest loan and that an offsetting
deduction should be allowed.' Based on that interpretation of the major-
ity opinion, he argued that the court should have overruled the broad
statement in Dean that an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to
the borrower.47
Judge Goffe, in a concurrence joined by three other judges, "agreed"
with the majority that Greenspun had not realized any gross income.48 He
disagreed, however, with the majority's implication that Greenspun might
be entitled to an interest deduction.49 The remainder of Judge Goffe's
opinion outlined his reasons for not overruling Dean. Drawing an analogy
between interest-free loans and fringe benefits, and noting that Congress
had begun to study the entire area of fringe benefits, Judge Goffe argued
that the tax treatment of interest-free loans should be left to Congress.
50
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Nims stated his view that Greenspun had
realized gross income from the low-interest loan.5" He objected to the ma-
jority's application of the Dean rationale because it allowed an imputed
interest deduction, and he expressed concern that, by continuing to follow
Dean, the court could eventually expect to be confronted with a case in
moved any justification for the exclusion approach. See notes 97-101 and accompanying
text infra.
46. 72 T.C. at 953 (Dawson, J., concurring). Support for Judge Dawson's reading can
be found in dictum by the majority:
In the circumstances of the present case ... whether or not we rest our conclu-
sion on Dean, our decision of no deficiency [Ze., no increase in taxable income]
would be the same. In other words, if petitioner were required to include in in-
come the economic benefit associated with the loan, he would be deemed to have
simultaneously paid an amount of interest equal to the income so reported.
72 T.C. at 950 (dictum). This implies that the Dean rule was one of exclusion and that
Greenspun was somehow different from Dean.
47. 72 T.C. at 953 (Dawson, J., concurring). Echoing the concurrence of Judge Opper
in Dean, Judge Dawson suggested that the exclusion approach of Dean is bound for rever-
sal. He stated that the court should be free from the "numbing effects" of stare decisis and
pointed out that overruling Dean would not prevent taxpayers from demonstrating that the
economic benefit derived from an interest-free loan is excludable from gross income under
some established rule. Id at 954.
48. 72 T.C. at 954 (Goffe, J., concurring).
49. Id Judge Goffe reasoned that the majority's failure to overrule Dean made any
implication that the taxpayer might be entitled to a deduction unnecessary.
50. Id at 955-56. The Tax Court has made similar observations in some of its recent
decisions. See, e.g., Baker v. Commissioner, [1980 Transfer Binder] TAX CT. REP. (CCH)
(75 T.C.) Dec. 37,354, at 4351 (Oct. 22, 1980); Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 1014.
51. 72 T.C. at 957-58 (Nims, J., dissenting).
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which the Commissioner imputes income to the lender of an interest-free
loan.
52
B. More Recent Decisions: Further Confusion but
No Further Discussion
Greenspun is the only case decided since Dean in which the Tax Court
has attempted to justify its exclusion approach. Having found in Green-
spun that the low-interest (or interest-free) use of funds is a benefit ordina-
rily includable in gross income and having found a corresponding
deduction for imputed interest to be allowable, the Tax Court appeared to
52. Id at 957-58. There are conflicting views over whether the lender of an interest-free
loan should recognize interest income. In Dean, the Tax Court stated that it had previously
held that "interest-free loans ... result in no ... interest income to the lender." 35 T.C.
1083, 1090 (1961) (citing Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 416 (1960);
Society Brand Clothes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 304 (1952); Combs Lumber Co. v.
Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 339 (1940)). It has been pointed out, however, that those cases
merely assumed, without discussion, that a lender realizes no income from an interest-free
loan. See Keller, supra note 8, at 250. In fact, Society Brand Clothes, Inc. cited Combs
Lumber Co. as its authority, 18 T.C. at 321, and Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. cited both Society
Brand Clothes, Inc. and Combs Lumber Co., 34 T.C. at 447. For a complete discussion of
this point, see Keller, supra.
There is ample support, both judicial and statutory, for the proposition that a lender
should recognize interest income from granting an interest-free loan. Perhaps the most di-
rect argument for charging income to the lender is one of quidpro quo: if the borrower is
allowed a deduction for interest that he or she would have paid, then the lender should be
required to recognize the very same interest as income. Commentators have suggested other
judicial doctrines that might support taxing the lender, including the assignment-of-income
doctrine and the doctrine of constructive receipt. See, e.g., Keller, supra at 244-50; Roth,
supra note 8, at 138-39.
The Internal Revenue Code allows the Commissioner to allocate and impute income
under §§ 482 and 483, respectively. Section 482 allows the Commissioner to allocate in-
come, deductions, credits, and allowances among organizations, trades, or businesses that
are controlled by the same interests. The applicable regulation, Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(1)
(1962), permits the Commissioner to allocate income and deductions among such controlled
business when one makes an interest-free loan to another. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
l(d)(4) (1962). The Commissioner's power, in effect, to create income under these regula-
tions has been upheld in a number of circuits. See, e.g., Fitzgerald Motor Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 508 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1975); Kerry Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 108,
109-10 (9th Cir. 1974); Liberty Loan Corp. v. United States, 498 F.2d 225, 228-32 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1089 (1974); B. Forman & Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144, 1155-
56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972). For a detailed discussion of the effect of § 482
on interest-free loans, see Keller, supra note 8, at 270-75. See also Callahan, supra note 5, at
30-33.
When property is transferred in exchange for an interest-free (or low-interest) loan, § 483
allows the Commiss'oner to treat part of the loan repayments as interest income to the
lender and interest expense to the borrower. The effects of § 483 on interest-free loans are
discussed in Keller, supra note 8, at 264-70; Sneed, supra note 27, at 662-85. For an example
of a transfer of property where § 483 might not apply, see notes 92-95 and accompanying
text infra.
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be on the verge of rejecting its exclusion approach. In the cases following
Greenspun, however, the Tax Court has chosen instead to preserve the ap-
proach.53 In so doing, the court has further obfuscated the issue. In addi-
tion, some of these more recent cases indicate that the court will continue
to apply its exclusion approach.
In Zager v. Commissioner,54 the first case after Greenspun to address the
issue of income from an interest-free loan, the Tax Court showed its ad-
herence to the exclusion approach. There the court held that the taxpayers
did not have to include in gross income the economic benefit derived from
nearly $90,000 in interest-free loans that they had obtained from a corpo-
ration in which they were the dominant stockholders. 5 Recognizing that
it had "perhaps made too sweeping a statement in Dean when [it] said
without qualification that 'an interest-free loan results in no taxable gain to
the borrower,' ,56 the court nonetheless affirmed Dean," reasoning that
the principle of stare decisis required Dean's continued application.5" The
Zager court also repeated the fringe benefit analogy proposed by Judge
Goffe in Greenspun, 9 suggesting that the tax treatment of interest-free
loans should be left to Congress.6°
53. See, e.g., Baker v. Commissioner, [1980 Transfer Binder] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (75
T.C.) Dec. 37,354 (Oct. 22, 1980); Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317 (1979); Creel v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-3135 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 1980);
Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-5084 (5th Cir. Feb. 8,
1980). For a discussion of these cases and their effect on the exclusion approach, see notes
54-82 and accompanying text infra.
54. 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-5084 (5th Cir. Feb. 8, 1980).
55. Id at 1009 (by implication). The court did not actually state in its opinion that the
taxpayers did not receive any taxable income. A reading of the case, however, shows that
the cited headnote reflects the court's opinion: the Commissioner sought to include the ben-
efit in the taxpayer's income and admitted that his position was contrary to the exclusion
created in Dean. Id. at 1010. The sole issue addressed by the court in Zager was whether
Dean should be overruled. ld Since the court refused to do so, its holding must have been
that the taxpayers in Zager realized no gross income. Zager is but one of the Tax Court's
recent opinions in which the holding is not explicitly stated. See note 37 supra.
56. 72 T.C. at 1012 (citing Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. at 1090).
57. 72 T.C. at 1010 (by implication).
58. Id. The court's invocation of stare decisis to protect the exclusion approach presents
a persuasive argument. Stare decisis is a principle of policy, however, not a mechanical
formula of adherence. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 109 (1940). There is substantial
dispute among members of the Tax Court over whether stare decisis should attach to the
Dean decision. Compare Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 954 (Dawson, J., concur-
ring) with Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 1013. The court's invocation of stare decisis is
related to its concern about the Commissioner's delay in issuing his nonacquiescence to
Dean. See note 28 supra.
59. See Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 955-56 (Goffe, J., concurring). See also
note 50 and accompanying text supra.
60. 72 T.C. at 1014. Although the Zager court apparently was not concerned that its
1981l
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Within a few weeks of the Zager decision, the Tax Court handed down
another interest-free-loan opinion in Creel v. Commissioner.61 In that case,
the court both reaffirmed Dean and appeared to carve out an exception to
its exclusion approach. In Creel, two taxpayers owned62 all of the out-
standing stock of three corporations and had received interest-free loans
from each.63 Relying on Dean, the court held that interest-free loans made
by two of the three corporations did not result in gross income to the tax-
payers.64 With respect to the interest-free loans from the third corporation,
though, the court reached a different result. The third corporation had
incurred substantial interest-bearing debt to third parties, all of which had
been personally guaranteed by the taxpayers.65 Looking to the substance
of the transaction, the court held that the corporation had incurred at least
part of its interest-bearing debt in order to make interest-free loans to the
taxpayers and that payments on the interest-bearing debt actually had dis-
charged the taxpayer's obligation.66 Accordingly, the court held that to the
extent of the actual payments of interest made by the corporation to its
fringe benefit analogy was less than precise, the analogy is questionable at best. The phrase
"fringe benefit" refers to something additional, some marginal form of compensation. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (5th ed. 1979). Yet in Greenspun, for example, the tax-
payer's sole compensation was the low-interest use of funds. It is thus quite conceivable that
a rule addressed to fringe benefits might not reach a taxpayer like Greenspun. Moreover, in
cases of an interest-free loan from a corporation to its shareholder, there is no employment
relationship, thus no compensation and, accordingly, there can be no fringe benefit. Thus,
even if the court were justified in refusing to overrule Dean with respect to interest-free loans
made by employers to employees, the fringe benefit argument does not justify the court's
refusal with regard to interest-free loans to shareholders.
61. 72 T.C. 1173 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-3135 (5th Cir. Feb. 15, 1980).
62. The taxpayers, Joseph Creel and Jonnie Parkinson, owned the following percent-
ages of the corporations involved:
Gulf Gulf Asphalt Gulf Equipment
Paving, Inc. Plant, Inc. Rentals, Inc.
Creel 80% 20% 50%
Parkinson 20% 80% 50%
63. 72 T.C. at 1174-77.
64. Id at 1180. The court's actual language was that the loans had "no direct tax ef-
fect." This obscure language might have been the result of the Greenspun court's lack of
clarity. See note 37 supra.
65. 72 T.C. at 1177.
66. Id at 1179-80. The court did not set out any facts concerning the taxpayer's guar-
antees. Neither did it offer any support for its proposition that the taxpayers had any obliga-
tions to discharge. While the terms of specific guarantees may vary, generally a guarantor is
liable only after there has been a failure of the debtor to perform. See L. SIMPSON, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 10 (1950). Since the court did not indicate that the
corporation had defaulted, it is unclear what might have given rise to the taxpayers' obliga-
tion.
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creditors, the taxpayers had received constructive dividend income and
had made interest payments.67 Given that under the Tax Court's exclu-
sion approach the economic benefit derived from an interest-free loan is
excludable from gross income, the purpose of finding a constructive divi-
dend and an imputed deduction is unclear.68
In its next interest-free loan case, Marsh v. Commissioner,69 the Tax
Court appeared to retreat from its holding in Greenspun. In Marsh, a
group of investors had received more than $1,300,000 in interest-free ad-
vances pursuant to a sales contract.7° Citing Greenspun, Zager, and Creel,
the Tax Court summarily rejected the Commissioner's attempt to include
the benefit of those interest-free advances in the taxpayers' gross income.7'
Since Marsh had been presented as a test case, 72 however, the court com-
mented in dictum on some of the issues raised.
Adopting the taxpayers' argument, the court pointed to the arm's-length
bargaining between the parties and to the absence of any discussion of
interest to conclude that the taxpayers had not received any economic ben-
efit from their interest-free advances.73 In responding to the taxpayers ar-
gument, the Commissioner had pointed to the broad sweep that is
67. 72 T.C. at 1179-80. As is demonstrated by the following example, difficulties with
the Creel holding might arise if a corporation receives an interest-free loan from another
corporation. Assume that X Corporation has interest-free loans from Y Corporation which,
in turn, has outstanding interest-bearing debt to third parties in excess of the interest-free
loans to X Corporation. Assume further that X Corporation has guaranteed the interest-
bearing obligations of Y Corporation. Under the Tax Court's holding in Creel, X Corpora-
tion would have constructive dividend income and an imputed interest deduction equal to
the amount of actual payments of interest made by Y Corporation to its interest-bearing
debt holders.
Under these facts, however, X Corporation might derive a net deduction from its interest-
free loans. I.R.C. § 243 allows a corporation to deduct at least 85% of the amount of divi-
dends received from a domestic corporation. If a court were to follow Creel in the case of an
intercorporate loan, the corporate borrower might receive a net deduction equal to at least
85% of the amount of the excluded benefit, provided that I.R.C. § 482, which allows the
Commissioner to allocate income among commonly controlled taxpayers, does not apply.
For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Keller, supra note 8, at 236; Callahan, supra
note 5, at 32.
68. The exception to the exclusion approach created by the Creel court operates in the
same way as the inclusion approach that Professor Sneed had suggested. For a discussion of
Professor Sneed's inclusion approach, see note 27 supra. See also notes 97-101 infra.
69. 73 T.C. 317 (1979).
70. Id at 323. The investors had agreed to sell natural gas but had been unable to
obtain sufficient financing from traditional sources to enable them to develop and produce
the gas from traditional sources. Id at 318-21. Accordingly, the prospective purchaser of
the gas agreed to advance the necessary capital. Id at 320.
71. Id. at 325-26.
72. Id at 327.
73. Id. at 327 (dictum).
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traditionally given to gross income. 74 In what appears to have been a sub-
stantial departure from the holding in Greenspun ,7 the court said that not
every economic benefit constitutes gross income 76 and that an economic
benefit is not usually considered income until it is realized;7 7 implying that
the economic benefit is realized at some time other than when the loan is
outstanding.78
The decisions in Zager, Creel, and Marsh have made it difficult to deter-
mine the precise substance and the proper application of the Tax Court's
exclusion approach. The more recent cases have likewise proven unen-
74. Id. at 327-28 (dictum).
75. The court in Greenspun had found that the low-interest (or interest-free) use of
funds constitutes an economic benefit. See Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 946-47.
76. 73 T.C. at 328 (dictum). In support of its statement that not every economic benefit
constitutes gross income, the court cited Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), Palmer v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937), and Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). Notably,
the Marsh court did not cite Greenspun, where the court stated that a low-interest note con-
stitutes an economic benefit ordinarily includable in income. 72 T.C. at 947.
77. 73 T.C. at 328 (dictum). The Tax Court has taken conflicting positions on when the
economic benefit from an interest-free loan is realized. Compare Greenspun v. Commis-
sioner, 72 T.C. at 95 1, with Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. at 328. See also notes 21 & 33
supra.
78. In Marsh, the Commissioner had refused to describe the economic benefit that the
taxpayers had received and had disclaimed that such a benefit constituted interest income.
73 T.C. at 328. The court, however, stated its belief that the Commissioner was attempting to
impute interest income and relying on Dean, pointed out that the Marsh taxpayers would
have been entitled to an offsetting interest deduction had they been required to report gross
income.
The Commissioner's reasons for refusing to describe the economic benefit do not appear
in the case but one such reason might have been the effect that such a description could have
on the investment interest limitation provided in I.R.C. § 163(d). Under that section, a
noncorporate taxpayer is entitled to deduct interest that is incurred to purchase or carry
investments only to the extent of $10,000 plus one-half of the taxpayer's net investment
income. Id § 163(d)(1). Section 163(d)(3)(A) defines net investment income as the excess of
the taxpayer's investment income (defined in § 163(d)(3)(B) to include interest income, divi-
dends, rentals, and royalties) over the taxpayer's investment expenses (defined in
§ 163(d)(3)(C) to exclude interest expense). The following example illustrates the way in
which the description of the economic benefit derived from an interest-free loan can affect a
taxpayer's investment interest limitation.
Assume that two taxpayers, X and Y, have each incurred $20,000 of investment interest
expense and that neither has any investment income for the taxable year. Further assume
that the two taxpayers have equal amounts of both income and deductions and that Y has
obtained from his employer a $100,000 interest-free loan to be repaid in one year. Finally,
assume that the prevailing rate of interest is 20% and that Y did not use the loan proceeds to
produce any investment income. If Y were to include as interest income the economic bene-
fit derived from his interest-free loan, he might receive a greater investment interest deduc-
tion than would be allowed to X.
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lightening.7 9 The Tax Court's most recent opinion on the income tax ef-
fects of an interest-free loan, Baker v. Commissioner,8" reflects its current
position. In Baker, the court merely echoed the Zager8" reasons for not
overruling Dean and suggested that a legislative remedy, rather than a de-
parture from stare decisis, would be necessary to effect any change.82
III. THE EXCLUSION APPROACH FAILS TO PRODUCE EQUAL TAX
TREATMENT AND INVITES ABUSE
A. The Exclusion Approach Does Not Provide Equal Tax Treatment
The justification in Greenspun for the exclusion approach was that an
interest-free loan is economically equivalent to an interest-bearing loan ac-
companied by an increase in income to cover the interest charged and that,
because of the availability of an offsetting interest deduction, the economic
benefit derived from an interest-free loan should be excluded from a tax-
payer's gross income in order to produce equal tax treatment between tax-
Calculation of Investment Interest Limitation
X Y
Investment Income None $20,000
less investment expenses None None
Net investment income None $20000
One-half net investment income None $10,000
plus statutory minimum $10,000 $10,000
Investment interest expense
current deductible $10,000 $20,000
If Y's marginal tax rate is 50%, the mere description of the economic benefit derived from
his interest-free loan could be worth $5,000 to him. The question is not whether the benefit
is or is not interest income but rather whether a taxpayer should be entitled to the Marsh
court's apparent presumption.
79. See Beaton v. Commissioner, TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) (40 T.C.M.) Dec.
37,275(M) (Sept. 22, 1980); Parks v. Commissioner, TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (CCH) (40 T.C.M.)
Dec. 37,238(M) (Sept. 15, 1980); Estate of Liechtung v. Commissioner, TAX CT. MEM. DEC.
(CCH) (40 T.C.M.) Dec. 37,198(M) (Sept. 2, 1980); Martin v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M.
(CCH) 531 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-1200 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 1980). None of these
cases have engaged in any analysis of the exclusion approach.
80. [1980 Transfer Binder] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (75 T.C.) Dec. 37,354 (Oct. 22, 1980).
81. Id at 4350-51 (quoting Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 1010-13). For a discus-
sion of Zager, see notes 54-60 and accompanying text supra.
82. [1980 Transfer Binder] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (75 T.C.) Dec. 37,354, at 4351 (Oct. 22,
1980). Notably, the author of the Baker opinion was Judge Raum, who had also been the
author of the opinion in Zager and the majority opinion in Dean.
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payers having either type of loan.83 Much has been made of the
proposition, first advanced in the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Dean ,84 that the exclusion approach might not produce equal tax treat-
ment between the two hypothetical taxpayers where an offsetting interest
deduction is not available.85 An examination of the tax effects of the exclu-
sion approach, however, shows that even where an offsetting deduction is
available, exclusion of the benefit from gross income would often not pro-
duce equal tax treatment. The following example demonstrates how un-
equal tax treatment might result.
Assume that A borrows $50,000 from his employer at an interest rate of
eighteen percent for a term of one year and is given an increase in salary
equal to $9,000, which is the interest charged ($50,000 x 18% = $9,000). A
would report the increase in salary as income and would deduct the inter-
est that he pays to his employer. Assume further that B, a coworker of A,
has an interest-free loan of $50,000 from her employer but has no increase
in compensation. Contrary to the Tax Court's theory, the exclusion ap-
proach would result in a different tax treatment for B than that afforded to
A, in terms of either her respective taxable income or her respective tax
liability.
Since some deductions are limited by the amount of a taxpayer's in-
come, 6 there could be a difference in the amount of deductions allowable
to B, the result being that the two hypothetical taxpayers, A and B, would
show different amounts of taxable income. Thus, in the above example,
because of the Tax Court's exclusion approach, B's allowable deduction
for medical expenses would be increased by $270 over that allowed toA .87
B's allowable deduction for contributions to charitable organizations,
however, would be $4,500 less than that allowed to A .88
83. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 18 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
85. In a number of cases, the Commissioner has unsuccessfully opposed the availabiity
of an offsetting deduction for interest. See note 44 supra.
86. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 151(e)(l) (deduction for personal exemption for dependent lim-
ited by the dependent's gross income); id § 163(d) (investment interest limitation limited by
net investment income); id § 170(a) (deduction for charitable contributions limited by ad-
justed gross income); id § 213(a) (deduction for medical expenses limited by adjusted gross
income); id § 219 (deduction for retirement savings limited by compensation includable in
gross income); id § 220 (deduction for retirement savings of certain married individuals
limited by compensation includible in gross income).
87. I.R.C. § 213(a) allows a deduction for certain medical expenses to the extent that
such expenses exceed 3% of a taxpayer's adjusted gross income, defined by § 62 to be gross
income minus certain deductions. A reduction in the amount of a taxpayer's gross income,
and therefore in adjusted gross income, can cause an increase in the allowable deduction for
medical expenses.
88. I.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(A) allows a deduction for contributions made to qualifying orga-
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Even in cases where there is no difference between the taxable incomes
of the two hypothetical taxpayers, the exclusion approach could result in a
difference between B's tax liability and that of her hypothetically
equivalent coworker, A. One illustration of such a difference can be seen
in the application of the maximum tax on wages, salaries, and other per-
sonal service income.89 In the above example, if both A and B have sala-
ries and other types of income, such as interest income and dividends, the
exclusion approach would produce a lower tax liability for B than for ,4,
even though they would both have the same amount of taxable income. 90
The above hypothetical example demonstrates that the Tax Court's ex-
clusion approach might often fail to produce equal tax treatment of two
similarly situated taxpayers in cases where an offsetting interest deduction
is available. The exclusion approach can distort either taxable income or
tax liability, or both. Simply stated, if equal tax treatment is the Tax
nizations in an amount up to, as a general rule, 50% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income,
defined by § 62 to be gross income minus certain deductions. A reduction in the amount of
a taxpayer's gross income, and therefore adjusted gross income, can similarly cause a de-
crease in the allowable deduction for charitable contributions.
89. The maximum tax places a 50% limit on the income tax rate that is levied on wages,
salaries, and other types of personal service income. See I.R.C. § 1348(b)(1). The tax is
actually levied on personal service taxable income, id § 1348(a), which is defined as that
portion of taxable income that bears the same ratio to total taxable income as personal
service income bears to adjusted gross income. Id § 1348(b)(2). The effect of that definition
is to apportion a taxpayer's itemized deductions between personal service income and all
other income. For a discussion of the mechanics of the maximum tax, see A. KROLL, MAXI-
MUM TAX ON EARNED INCOME, [1980] 300 TAX MNGM'T (BNA) A-18 to-22.
90. Application of the maximum tax to the hypothetical coworkers, A and B, demon-
strates how the Tax Court's exclusion approach could result in disparate tax liabilities even
where the two taxpayers' taxable incomes are equal. Assume the facts of the example set out
in the text following note 81 supra. Assume further that, in addition to the loan transactions,
A and B each have salaries of $100,000, net dividend income of $35,000, interest income of
$15,000, and net itemized deductions of $39,000. After considering their respective loan
transactions, A and B would show the following results, using the exclusion approach to
determine the tax treatment of B's interest-free loan:
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Court's objective, the exclusion approach often might not achieve it.9'
B. The Exclusion Approach Opens the Door to Potential Abuse
The Tax Court has held that the exclusion approach applies even when
a low-interest loan was granted as compensation for services or as an in-
ducement to enter into a sales contract.92 Compensation, however, is not
the only type of income that a taxpayer can receive. Consider, for example,
a taxpayer who sells investment property.93 Section 61 (a)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code states that gross income includes gains from dealing in




Compensation attributable to loan 9,000 none
Total Personal Service Income $109,000 $100,000
Other Income:
Net Dividends 35,000 35,000
Interest 15,000 15,000
Total adjusted gross income $159,000 $150,000
Net itemized deductions (39,000) (39,000)
Interest deduction attributable to loan (9,000) none
Personal exemption (1,000) 10)
Taxable income $110,000 $110,000
Multiplied by the ratio of personal service income to
adjusted gross income 68.55% 66.67%
Personal service taxable income $ 75,405 $ 73,337
Because of the maximum tax rate of 50%, the exclusion approach would produce a tax liabil-
ity for B that is $1,034 lower than A's.
91. Apart from the failure of the exclusion approach to achieve its stated objective of
providing equal tax treatment between taxpayers with interest-free loans and those with
interest-bearing loans accompanied by an increase in income, the approach has no clearly
definable limits. For example, if the availability of an offsetting deduction justifies an exclu-
sion from gross income, then C, an employee of a charitable organization, who has a salary
of $20,000 and donates $5,000 to his employer, could report only $15,000 as gross income.
For that matter, one might argue that the recipient of an interest-bearing loan accompanied
by an increase in income to cover the interest charged should be allowed, under the Tax
Court's exclusion approach, to exclude from gross income the salary attributable to the off-
setting deduction.
92. See Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7624
(9th Cir. Nov. 26, 1979). See also notes 31-37 and accompanying text supra.
93. In Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317 (1979), the Commissioner might have ar-
gued that the interest-free advances constituted part of the sales price of the gas sold. See
notes 69-78 and accompanying text supra. He did not raise that issue, however, and the
court did not address it.
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property. Yet a taxpayer dealing in property might use an interest-free
loan as a device not only to avoid reporting income, but also to create an
artificial loss. The following example illustrates the potential for tax
avoidance.
Assume that a taxpayer sold investment property with an adjusted basis
of $400,000 and a fair market value of $500,000 in exchange for $300,000
in cash and an interest-free loan of $1,000,000, where the prevailing rate of
interest is 20%, to be repaid in one year. The economic benefit of the inter-
est-free loan to the taxpayer would then be $200,000. If that benefit were
includable in the gross income of the taxpayer-seller, then the reported
sales price would be $500,000, yielding a taxable gain of $100,000, equal to
the economic gain. If, however, the Tax Court were to apply the exclusion
approach of Dean and Greenspun, the reported sales price would be
$300,000, yielding a deductible loss of $100,000, despite the economic gain.
To subject the transaction to income tax, the Commissioner would have to
try to convince the Tax Court to overrule its exclusion approach.94 In light
of the Tax Court's reluctance to change its approach, demonstrated by re-
cent cases," the Commissioner's chance of succeeding in such an attempt
appears remote.
The potential for abuse inherent in the exclusion approach also extends
to situations in which one taxpayer could effectively pass through an inter-
est deduction to another taxpayer to obtain certain tax benefits for the sec-
94. The Commissioner might attempt to impute interest income to the taxpayer under
I.R.C. § 483, but there is some question whether that section applies when an interest-free
loan is granted by a buyer. Under § 483, where a sales contract calling for deferred pay-
ments bears no interest rate (or an unrealistically low interest rate), the Commissioner is
entitled to treat a portion of each payment made by the buyer to the seller as interest. Al-
though no cases have been reported on the issue, one might well argue that the transaction
set out in the text would be subject to § 483 only if loan payments made by the seller to the
buyer could be found to constitute part or all of the sales price. See I.R.C. § 483(c)(I).
The income tax regulations contain an example much like the one set out in the text. An
employer (seller) sells 500 shares of stock to one of its employees (buyer) for $10,000. Simul-
taneously, the employer (seller) lends the employee (buyer) $10,000 interest-free to be repaid
over five years. The regulations state that the annual payments by the employee (buyer) are
subject to § 483. In other words, under § 483, the Commissioner can impute interest income
to the employer (seller) and an interest deduction to the employee (buyer). Treas. Reg.
§ 1.483-1(b)(6) Ex. 6 (1966). The hypothetical example set out in the text, however, differs
from the one in the regulations. Here it is the buyer, not the seller, who makes the interest-
free loan and it is the seller, not the buyer, who makes the repayments.
One commentator has concluded that § 483 should apply to a sale of property in conjunc-
tion with an interest-free loan. See Keller supra, note 8, at 266. The examples he sets out,
however, describe situations like the example in the income tax regulations, rather than like
the example set out in the text of this Comment. Id at 265-70.
95. See Baker v. Commissioner, [1980 Transfer Binder] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) (75 T.C.)
Dec. 37,354 (Oct. 22, 1980). See also notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
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ond taxpayer that might be denied to the first. For example, a corporate
taxpayer with a substantial net operating loss carryforward could incur
interest-bearing debt to a third party and use the funds thus obtained in a
transaction similar to the one in Greenspun to pay for certain services. The
corporation would be allowed an interest deduction although the deduc-
tion would produce no immediate tax benefit. The same interest deduc-
tion, however, would in effect pass from the corporation to the individual
who received the interest-free loan. While the individual taxpayer would
not be allowed an interest deduction under the exclusion approach, neither
would he be required to report gross income.9 6
IV. AN INCLUSION APPROACH PROVIDES EQUAL TAX TREATMENT
WITHOUT CREATING THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE
The courts should apply a two-step analysis to determine the income tax
effects of an interest-free loan. Under such an analysis, the economic ben-
efit derived from an interest-free loan would be included in the borrower's
gross income. Then, to the extent that a taxpayer could otherwise justify
its allowance, an imputed interest deduction would be allowed. Besides
being more faithful to the well-established doctrines of determining gross
income and deductions,97 such an inclusion approach would eliminate
many of the problems created by the exclusion approach.
An inclusion approach would provide the equal tax treatment that the
Tax Court has repeatedly sought. 8 Thus, the taxpayer with an interest-
free loan and the taxpayer with an interest-bearing loan accompanied by
an increase in compensation or dividends would each include in gross in-
come the economic benefit received, the former merely having received an
intangible benefit and the latter, a tangible one.9 9 To the extent that each
96. Some attempts to pass through an interest deduction from one taxpayer to another
might be unavailing because of the Commissioner's power, under I.R.C. § 482, to reallocate
income and deductions among related taxpayers. For a discussion of § 482, see note 52
supra. That power, however, extends only to commonly controlled organizations, trades, or
businesses, and not to individuals. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a) (1962). But see Borge v.
Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673, 675-76 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969) (where
individual is actually operating as a trade or business, § 482 may apply). Many situations
could arise where § 482 would not apply to an interest-free loan transaction. See, e.g.,
Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 318 (1979) (no element of control); Greenspun v. Commis-
sioner, 72 T.C. 931 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7624 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 1979) (both
taxpayers were individuals).
97. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
98. For a discussion of the Tax Court's equal-tax-treatment theory, see notes 41-42 and
accompanying text supra.
99. Valuation has been mentioned as a difficulty to be reckoned with if taxpayers are
required to report as gross income the economic benefit derived from an interest-free loan.
See Keller, supra note 8, at 256-57. Cf. Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234, 241 (7th Cir.
[Vol. 30:497
Tax Problems of Interest-Free Loans
could justify its allowance, a deduction would be allowed. Thus, the loan
transactions would result in the same taxable income and tax liability for
the two taxpayers.
An inclusion approach, however, would do more than provide equal tax
treatment. It would also eliminate much of the potential for abuse inher-
ent in the exclusion approach. In the earlier example describing a sale of
investment property in conjunction with an interest-free loan," an inclu-
sion approach would require that the taxpayer report as gross income the
economic value derived from his interest-free loan, thus causing him to
report as taxable income the full economic gain that he had realized. Simi-
larly, an inclusion approach would restrict the possibility of passing
through interest deductions from one taxpayer to another. 0 '
V. CONCLUSION
The Tax Court has created a rule of taxation based solely on the form of
a transaction, that not only fails to achieve its avowed purpose of provid-
ing equal tax treatment to similarly situated taxpayers, but also creates the
potential for abuse. In Dean, the Tax Court established a rule with very
little analysis. In Greenspun, the Tax Court's unsuccessful attempt to justi-
fy Dean was unconvincing and did nothing to resolve Dean's inherent
problems. In subsequent cases, the court has further confused its approach
without providing a reasoned analysis to support its theory. As has been
shown in this Comment, even where an offsetting deduction is available,
the exclusion from gross income of the economic benefit derived from an
interest-free loan, at best, results in disparate tax results to similarly situ-
ated taxpayers and, at worst, opens the door to potential abuse.
By following a more traditional inclusion approach, that is, by including
in a taxpayer's gross income the economic benefit derived from an interest-
free loan, and by allowing an imputed deduction where the taxpayer can
otherwise justify it, the Tax Court can resolve most, if not all, of the
problems that it has created.
Michael A. Bell
1978) (valuation mentioned as a difficulty in resolving the federal gift tax issue). But valua-
tion is always difficult when income is received in a form other than cash. See, e.g., Burnet
v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); Philadelphia Park Amusements Co. v. United States, 126 F.
Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954). See also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE
TAXATION, EXAMINATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S TAX RETURNS FOR 1969-1972, 158-60
(Comm. Print 1974). See generally I J. MERTENS, supra note 21, § 5.08.
100. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text supra.
101. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
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